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Fate and freedom: can they coexist? Is there a divine reasoning behind 
the occurrences in the universe, and if so, are all occurrences predetermined? 
Such questions have plagued philosophers for more than two thousand years. 
Some philosophers deny the existence of human freedom and leave everything 
in the hands of God or fate; some philosophers argue that everything is random; 
and some philosophers insist there is room for human freedom under the general 
guidance of a divine hand. They generally rely on complex, rigorous systems, 
with logical consistency and existential evidence. These systems, however, are 
not airtight, and the question of fate and free will is left unresolved.
Systematic philosophers are not the only ones to grapple with the concept 
of fate. It is also a poetic and literary concept. Poets and writers are fascinated 
by a strange incongruence in human existence: humans seem free to make 
choices and control their own destiny, but there are always instances in life that 
remain above human volition. The poets and writers recognize this as one of the 
mysteries of the human condition: is freedom an illusion and the course of life 
determined by an outside force? If so, is that outside force unconscious, or is it 
intelligent? If intelligent, is it benign? In poetry and literature, unlike in 
philosophy, these questions do not need to be resolved.
This paper examines the approach to fate and free will by both a 
philosopher, Boethius, and a poet, Homer, in their respective works The
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2Consolation of Philosophy and The Iliad. Both writers develop sophisticated 
systems of fate, though Boethius as a philosopher presents a more internally 
consistent system, while Homer as a poet presents a more open system that 
depends on the perspectives of the poem’s characters. In The Consolation, 
Boethius explains that God controls the entire universe through his divine reason 
or Providence, which unfolding in time is labeled Fate. Inanimate objects and 
irrational beings are ruled by Fate, but human beings, gifted with reason, have 
the free will to escape the rule of Fate and instead become aligned with the mind 
of God; they are responsible for the morality of their behavior. In The Iliad, the 
god Zeus makes large-scale plans that unfold in somewhat loose ways; there are 
also larger-scale plans outside of his decision-making sphere that he tries to 
bring about, and individual fates of humans that are inflexible and set in stone. 
Despite these certainties, humans have freedom to act within them and thus gain 
glory or shame depending on their actions. Both authors insist that there is room 
for human freedom within the scope of Fate, and this inclusion raises problems 
that defeat their systems.
Divine plan
Both Boethius and Homer acknowledge that God or the gods have a plan 
for the world and for human beings, but they disagree on the scope of this plan. 
According to Boethius, God’s plan for the world is eternal and all-encompassing, 
while Homer’s Zeus creates a plan specifically for Achilles, not for the whole 
world, not preexistent, and influenced by the prayers of humans.
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3According to Boethius, God’s plan is called Providence, the divine reason 
of God (104). This divine reason is above everything, unmoved by any external 
force or intelligence (Chadwick 234); in turn, it is the first cause and mover of 
everything else (Marenbon 118-119). Providence is the non-extended plan, but 
when it unfolds within the confines of time and space it is called Fate (Boethius 
104). Fate is bound to and operates under Providence, but human volition is free 
from the laws and burdens of Fate while remaining under Providence. Indeed, 
the closer one’s mind aligns with the mind of God, the freer one becomes from 
Fate (Chadwick 242). Providence is inherently good and just, specifically just to 
humans, who are the focus of Providence. Events that occur in time often seem 
unjust or evil, but these things will always result in something ultimately good 
(Marenbon 119). Personified Philosophy says, “All fortune whether pleasant or 
averse is meant either to reward or discipline the good or to punish or correct the 
bad” (Boethius 111). So all that befalls humans, good or bad, is meant to edify 
their souls and bring them closer to the mind of God—to Providence—even if this 
ultimate end cannot be understood by human minds.
Homer, too, conceives of a divine plan for human beings. Zeus, the king 
of the gods, has a measure of control over events that will take place, and his 
decrees are not revocable, nor can anyone stand in their way. Prior to the Trojan 
War, Zeus decreed that the Greeks would take Troy in the tenth year of the war 
(Homer 103). He agrees to glorify Achilles after Thetis beseeches him, bowing 
his head to signify this decree—and once he has done this, the decree cannot be 
reversed (95). Later on in the story, Zeus develops his plan for Achilles: Hector
3
Johnson: Liberty by Necessity
Published by Digital Showcase @ University of Lynchburg, 2014
4will wreak havoc on the Achaeans, Achilles’ friend Patroclus will go out in 
response and die at Hector’s hand, and then Achilles will be roused to action and 
gain his glory (247).
Clearly, Zeus’s plan is smaller and less abstract than Boethius’s 
Providence. While Providence is an eternal idea, not bound by time, Zeus 
makes up his plan as he goes along. First he agrees to glorify Achilles, and later 
he makes a specific plan for Achilles’ glorification. This plan concerns only 
Achilles and those around him in the war, unlike Providence, which governs the 
entire history of the universe. Finally, Zeus’s plan is influenced by humans, as 
when Thetis begs Zeus to glorify her human son Achilles (Lesky 175), but 
Providence precedes humans—it brings them to their best ends and does not 
merely operate at the mercy of their whims. Despite all these differences, both 
Homer and Boethius agree that the high God’s plan, once established, cannot be 
shaken or steered off course.
Inevitable, but divinely willed
Both Boethius and Homer make room for events in time that are not 
directly imposed by the divine being, but are destined to happen—they are not 
freely willed. According to Boethius, these events are the unfolding of Fate 
according to the law of causation. To Homer, there are two types of destined 
events that are not willed by the gods: large-scale destinies that supersede the 
will of Zeus, and individual deaths of warriors that cannot be overruled by the 
gods. The two disagree on the gods’ relationship to the inevitable: Boethius 
believes that God is the ultimate cause of all events but does not unfold them in
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5time, while Homer maintains that the gods’ plans are distinct from fate, yet the 
gods work to make sure that fate unfolds correctly.
According to Boethius, nothing happens that is not ultimately part of God’s 
plan. But God’s plan, when unfolding in time as Fate, leaves room for secondary 
causation—one event causes another event to happen, while the ultimate cause 
of these events is God. God is not the immediate cause of these events, 
because he does not operate in time but sees all things as present—hence the 
term Providence, meaning "looking forth”, as opposed to foreknowledge 
(Boethius 132-133). Nonetheless, these events have causes—in some sense, 
they are inevitable. Boethius makes a great effort, however, to explain that 
causation does not imply necessity. It would seem that everything that happens 
is necessary and inevitable—predetermined—if everything is ruled by causation. 
But Boethius redefines the term "necessary.” To him, something is necessary if 
and only if it is in its nature to exist in such a way—if it has always been that way 
and always will be. It is not necessary if it is caused to be in a certain state at a 
certain time. Everything is subject to causation, true, but causation is simply the 
realization of one possible event—other things could happen, but do not happen. 
Just because they do not happen does not imply that they could not have 
happened, and therefore what happens is not necessary (135). These events 
are contingent: God knows what will happen, and he is the ultimate cause of 
what will happen, but certainly something else could have happened (Marenbon 
40-41).
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6But if God knows what will happen with these contingent events, are they 
not therefore necessary events? Again, Boethius appeals to God’s eternal state 
to answer this question. If a contingent event is unfolding in the present, it is 
necessary insofar as it must be taking place at this very moment, but this 
necessity is not imposed upon it. It was caused to happen but it could have been 
caused to happen differently—what happened was not necessary. In the same 
way God views time. All time is eternally present to him, and in the same way 
that humans do not impose necessity on something when observing it, God does 
not impose necessity on future events (Boethius 125). Overall, Boethius sees 
Fate in inanimate nature as ultimately caused by God but separated by degrees 
of causation, and inevitable but not constrained by absolute necessity.
Homer also sees necessary occurrences separate from the gods’ willed 
intentions. These operate in large-scale destinies and in the individual deaths of 
humans ("Fate”). The gods can steer the events of humans’ lives, glorifying or 
humiliating them, but they cannot alter how and when a man will die, and they 
cannot derail the ultimate course of humanity. Instead, they work to make sure 
that the destiny of humanity is carried out and not violated. Zeus recognizes a 
sense of ultimate destiny, pertaining to the larger course of humanity, apart from 
the plans he makes for Achilles and the other humans. Zeus does not feel 
constrained by it, but works to fulfill it (Solomon 444): he relies on scales to tell 
him who is destined to win a particular battle (Homer 233-234), and he 
dispatches the gods to stop Achilles from destroying Troy before it is fated to fall 
(504). This obeisance to fate is also evident in Poseidon, another god: he sees
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7that the line of Dardanus is destined to survive the destruction of Troy through 
Aeneas, so he rescues the hero from death at the hands of Achilles (513). The 
gods do not control destiny, and they do not try to contradict it; instead, they keep 
the humans from violating it.
Inevitable Fate above Zeus’s will is also evident in the deaths of the 
heroes. Homeric "Fate” refers to the lifespan of the individual, whose ultimate 
end is unavoidable; even the gods cannot stop it (Vivante, The Iliad: Action as 
Poetry 92). It also refers to the inevitable end that all mortals face, as well as the 
inescapable time and manner in which each individual will die (Solomon 449­
450). The gods know that each hero has a specific death waiting for him, as the 
next few examples demonstrate. Achilles’ goddess mother Thetis knows that he 
is doomed to die young at Troy, but all she can do is lament; his death cannot be 
avoided (Homer 91). Zeus considers saving his son Sarpedon when the Trojan 
warrior is about to face Patroclus, but Hera stops him, recognizing that Sarpedon 
must die (427); later, Zeus contemplates rescuing Hector from Achilles, but 
Athena reminds him Hector was doomed long ago (547). The gods foresee 
individuals’ deaths, and do not stand in Fate’s way.
Homer and Boethius both show that things happen according to Fate in 
this world beyond human volition and distinct from divine mandate, but they 
disagree on the gods’ involvement in the unfolding of this Fate. Homer’s gods 
are omniscient but not omnipotent; they know the destiny of Troy or the ultimate 
deaths of individual warriors, but cannot stop them or alter them. Instead, they 
act as servants to Fate, preventing humans from making Fate go awry. They are
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8heavily involved in the unfolding of Fate, even if they do not will it. Boethius’s 
God, on the other hand, is omniscient and omnipotent, but separated from the 
unfolding of Fate by the dimension of time. In God’s eyes, he causes all events 
to unfold under Providence, but in the human dimension of time, God does not 
actively unfold events. Thus, Homer’s gods cannot change Fate but make sure it 
is carried out, and Boethius’s God rules over Fate but does not render events in 
time necessary; they unfold according to his law of causation.
Human agency
Both Boethius and Homer make efforts to preserve human free will and 
responsibility in their systems of fate. Boethius explains that humans still have 
free will because they are rational beings and their minds are not controlled by 
the laws of inanimate nature, while also referring to his argument that foreknown 
events in time are not necessary, despite God’s all-encompassing Providence. 
This is important to him because it absolves God of the behaviors of evil men 
and deletes complacency or resignation—humans must choose to live morally. 
Human free will in Homer is found in the phenomenon of double causation, 
wherein a god intervenes in a human’s actions, but the human is still left 
responsible for what occurs. In both cases, the insistence on human agency and 
denial of necessity renders the previously developed concepts of Fate weak.
Boethius believes that humans have free will because they are rational 
beings. If a being has reason it has the ability to make decisions, and this 
decision-making is what distinguishes rational beings from non-rational beings 
(Boethius 119). Non-rational beings are controlled by the laws of physics—they
8
Agora, Vol. 23 [2014], Art. 4
https://digitalshowcase.lynchburg.edu/agora/vol23/iss2014/4
9cannot decide what to do, but rather operate under the causality of Fate. But 
minds are free from these material laws and can make choices (Marenbon 123). 
They can either choose to become more like the mind of God, freeing 
themselves from Fate, or they can turn from the mind of God and instead 
become subject to the materialistic controls of Fate (Boethius 105). This idea of 
free will seems problematic if Providence controls everything and if God is 
omniscient. However, as stated before, Boethius does not see God’s 
omniscience rendering all occurrences necessary. According to his explanation 
of contingency, Boethius argues that humans have choices with regard to what 
will happen. God knows what is going to happen, but humans still have to make 
a choice to make it happen. Boethius also cites another argument to negate the 
idea that human agency is enslaved to necessity. He believes that things can 
only be known within the capacity of the knower: the thing itself is not known 
(126). This is known as the lamblichus Principle (Sharples 216). He uses this 
idea to argue that not only is God’s knowledge in a non-temporal dimension, but 
fundamentally of a different nature than human knowledge. Humans presuppose 
that God sees things way they do, and by human logic, Providence and 
omniscience would render human free will impossible; but God sees beyond this 
quandary. In God’s eternally-present dimension, things are bound to happen 
according to his plan, but on the human and temporal level, man can clearly see 
that he has free choice. In this system humans are compelled to choose to live 
rightly, as Philosophy says on the last lines of The Consolation: “A great
9
Johnson: Liberty by Necessity
Published by Digital Showcase @ University of Lynchburg, 2014
10
necessity is laid upon you...to be good, since you live in the sight of a judge who 
sees all things” (Boethius 137).
Homer presents a similar idea of human agency, although not as 
philosophically dense. Zeus’s plans and the unfolding of Fate do not remove 
human responsibility. Homer’s story is about humans infused with divine 
qualities, the choices they make, and the glory or shame they receive. Were the 
gods given all credit or blame for the occurrences, the humanity of the epic would 
be gone. Within Homeric epic, the gods should not be seen as controlling 
humans or removing their will, but enhancing human characteristics; the gods 
work through humans and even dictate the outcome, but the humans are clearly 
the agents of action (Lesky 179-180). This phenomenon is double causation: on 
the divine level, the god intervenes and brings about an end, but on a lower level, 
the humans perform it and are not left free of praise or blame. Zeus makes 
large-scale decrees, but does not remove the human ability to make individual 
decisions; for example, Zeus declares Hector to be doomed but Hector decides 
on his own whether to fight Achilles (Lesky 173). The humans themselves are 
aware of divine influence, but do not blame everything on the gods; they assume 
personal responsibility, such as when Helen recognizes that Aphrodite has 
bewitched her but calls herself a "bitch” anyway for her role in the Trojan War 
(Lesky 195). The gods enhance or diminish human abilities, and often dictate the 
outcome of an event, but the humans themselves make the decisions during the 
event and are left with the corresponding praise or blame.
10
Agora, Vol. 23 [2014], Art. 4
https://digitalshowcase.lynchburg.edu/agora/vol23/iss2014/4
11
Both Homer and Boethius make room for human agency by appealing to 
the distinction between the realm of the divine and the realm of humans. The 
Iamblichus Principle and double causation present the same idea: on the divine 
level, yes, humans are to some extent pawns of divine will, but this does not 
remove human responsibility or choice on the human level. In Boethius’s case, 
humans assume that God’s all-encompassing plan deletes human decision 
because they do not understand the way God knows the world; their knowledge 
is limited to the temporal realm. Nonetheless, in this temporal realm humans still 
have to make decisions; God’s Providence can in no way negate human 
rationality. Homer’s idea is slightly different: things are caused both by divine will 
and by human action. Different beings are responsible for the same willed 
events, but these beings are in different dimensions. Both authors preserve 
human agency by acknowledging the fundamental distinction between the divine 
mind and the human mind.
Can Human Freedom and Fate Coexist?
In their efforts to preserve human agency, Boethius and Homer face an 
issue: can humans, through free choice, dislodge the ultimate plan/destiny of the 
world? This is problematic for Boethius because his system claims that there is 
nothing outside God’s Providence. This problem is evident in Homer when the 
gods step in to stop humans from violating Fate. Is it possible for the overarching 
plan or destiny of the world to fail, and if it is possible but does not occur, what
accounts for this?
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Boethius’s system is built on a contradiction. He claims that Providence 
arranges "what is best for the individual” (Chadwick 243). Yet, at the same time, 
he insists on human freedom within this system. If humans are free, it would 
seem they have the option of violating the arrangements of Providence. Yet, 
Providence is always operating to bring about good and determine what is best 
for the individual. How, then, does God direct humans toward what is best for 
them if human volition is free? Do humans always choose the path that fits with 
the plans of Providence, thereby making everything a fortunate roll of the dice?
Or do humans reject God’s plan and render Providence ineffectual? Do humans, 
when they turn away from the divine mind and instead become ensnared in the 
clutches of Fate, find themselves in another God-controlled mechanism, 
Providence, and thus without freedom after all? For even if God does not directly 
control events in contingent events unfolding in Fate due to his eternality, he is 
still their ultimate cause and is omniscient; the freedom of contingency is not truly 
free. If Providence does not take away human volition, then the realization of 
Providence is left unaccounted for.
Homer’s system also leaves room for a quandary because of agency. Is 
Fate truly inevitable, or can it be overturned if the gods do not follow it? At 
several points in the Iliad, gods ponder not following Fate. Zeus asks the gods if 
he should suspend the deaths of Sarpedon and Hector, even though they are 
doomed, as if he has a choice to overrule this Fate. It is only at the counsel of 
Hera and Athena that he decides not to intervene—Athena tells him that he can
do as he pleases but "none of the deathless gods will praise you” (Homer 547).
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It also appears that humans themselves can defeat the cruel hand of Fate. 
Achilles is capable of defeating Troy before it is fated to fall, and of destroying 
Aeneas before he is fated to die. Only because the gods decide to intervene is 
Achilles stopped. Thus, Fate is only a powerful and inevitable force insofar as 
the gods decide to uphold it. So why do they uphold it, and why should they 
disallow humans from altering it? Homer, like Boethius, has left the realization of 
Fate unaccounted for—Fate does happen, and the gods are responsible for 
making sure it happens, but there is no explanation as to why it has to happen.
Conclusion
The Consolation of Philosophy by Boethius and The Iliad by Homer 
suggest that the world is governed largely by divine decrees, that there is some 
room for an extra-divine force called Fate, and that humans have the freedom to 
choose within the bounds of these forces. Homer’s divine decrees are the plans 
that Zeus creates within time, while Boethius creates the concept of Providence, 
the eternal reason of God that always brings about ultimate good. Boethius sees 
Fate as underneath Providence, but should be understood by humans as a non­
divine force which operates under the binding laws of physics, while Homer sees 
this entity as separate from Zeus, possibly above him, ruling the destiny of 
mankind and declaring the irrevocable deaths of men.
Both authors understand the need for freedom within their systems—for 
Boethius, man must understand he has freedom so he can act responsibly and 
with moral urgency, and for Homer, man must be free so that the choices of 
heroes can be legitimately judged honorable or dishonorable. Boethius believes
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humans are free because they are rational and operate in time, meaning that free 
choice and contingency are inevitable, while Homer sees humans as free 
because they operate on a different plane than the gods—though the gods 
enhance human behavior, they do not revoke human responsibility. This last 
inclusion topples both systems—Boethius leaves the door open for the defeat or 
failure of powerful Providence, while Homer renders Fate revocable. The 
ambiguity and incongruence of Homer’s system is deliberate, as he is a poet—it 
does not detract from his work or his goals. But Boethius sets out to make a 
deliberate doctrine of Providence, and his unconvincing attempt to account for 
human freedom shakes the foundation of his entire theory. As Boethius and 
Homer show in their works, Fate and freedom cannot easily coexist.
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